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I. Introduction
A. Scope
This research memorandum is an analysis of whether complicity in genocide and aiding
and abetting differ, whether under the principle of cumulative convictions a person could be
charged under both modes of liability, and what such charging language could look like. 1
The Mechanism of International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) faces an unusual challenge
in their charge to carry on and complete the work of the International Criminal Tribunal of
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR). Such a
challenge is evident in seemingly conflicting treatment of modes of liability in the ICTY and
ICTR.
Customary international law, domestic jurisprudence, and statutes governing the ICTY
ICTR offer varying, but comparable approaches to complicity and aiding and abetting.
Particularly with respect to the ICTY and ICTR, the Tribunals contradicted the plain language
interpretation of statutes concerning modes of liability through case law. Presented with such a
large and conflicting body of case law from which to draw upon, the MICT must determine
whether it will follow previous Tribunal jurisprudence, the typical international approach, or
forge a new standard of treatment for modes of liability.
The second issue is that of cumulative convictions--a principle under which the Tribunals
can charge a person with multiple crimes that stem from the same underlying acts. The Tribunals

1

The issues presented are: (1) Complicity in genocide v. aiding and abetting (and other forms of responsibility for
genocide), (2) In light of any distinction or lack thereof, could a Chamber ever enter convictions and/or sentences
for both complicity in genocide and other forms of liability of genocide (taking into account relevant conviction and
sentencing principles, like cumulative convictions)?, and (3) Finally, what is the manner/form in which complicity
in and other modes of liability for genocide should be charged by the Prosecution?
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considered cumulative convictions in terms of criminal charges, like war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity. By presenting the issue of modes of liability and cumulative
convictions, MICT takes on a new issue of interpretation. It is possible that a distinction, or lack
thereof, between modes of liability may preempt addressing this issue. If the modes of liability
do not differ, there is no issue with regards to cumulative convictions, as there would be no need
to charge both complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting in genocide. If the modes of
liability do differ, the principle of cumulative convictions may still prevent MICT from entering
cumulative convictions.
Finally, the MICT must determine how to charge a person under these modes of liability.
Should the MICT use the same format and style employed by the ICTY and ICTR? Does a
difference or lack of difference between modes of liability affect the type of charging language
the MICT should use? What type of language would best accomplish the goals of the MICT.
The following sections will illustrate that complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting
are related but not the same and that complicity in genocide is a mode of liability. Because of
this slight difference, a discussion regarding cumulative convictions does not involve an in-depth
analysis of modes of liability. Moving forward, the MICT should mimic the specificity used in
the ICTY and ICTR indictments by adding additional detail to the charging language.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Confusion with complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting stems from a
complicated history of the two modes of liability and a conflation between complicity in
genocide as a crime and a mode of liability. Although ICTY and ICTR statutes explicitly

9

reference aiding and abetting as a mode of liability and complicity appears only under the
genocide statute, the Tribunals rejected complicity as a purely criminal charge.
2. The view of aiding and abetting differs across customary international law, the
jurisprudence of individual nations, and international courts and tribunals. Despite the
different approaches, the majority of legal systems and Tribunals tend to treat complicity
as a broad term that encompasses other modes of liability, like aiding and abetting.
3. The MICT, in following prior Tribunal case law and widely held view of modes of
liability, should consider complicity in genocide as a broad term for accomplice liability
which encompasses more specific modes of liability like aiding and abetting.
4. The Tribunals contemplated cumulative convictions with regard to elements of a
crime, but not in relation to modes of liability. The various tests and requirements to enter
cumulative convictions preempt the need to address the difference in modes of liability.
However, because the charge of aiding and abetting captures the class of perpetrators
contemplated by complicity, MICT should not need to charge both complicity in
genocide and aiding and abetting.
5. MICT should look to prior charging language used by ICTY and ICTR for form and
specificity required in indictments. Prior indictments from the ICTY and ICTR employ a
detailed, narrative structure in which the accused’s crimes are given lengthy explanations,
while the charges themselves are notably less detailed. The MICT should consider adding
specificity to the indictment by quoting the statutory language under which the MICT
seeks to charge the accused.
II. Factual Background
10

To understand the complexities surrounding the discussion and treatment of modes of
liability, there first must be an understanding of the statutory language. ICTR and ICTY use the
same statutes to define modes of liability. This statute seeks to capture the actions of persons
who, “…planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in [the relevant articles of the respective
statutes], shall be individually responsible for the crime” 2 This language is relatively
straightforward and there is little debate as to whether this section defines aiding and abetting as
one of the modes of liability acknowledge by the ICTR and ICTY. The same, however, cannot
be said for sections defining complicity as a mode of liability or crime.
Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR specifically enumerates complicity as a mode of liability;
rather, complicity is inferred as a mode of liability. In both ICTR and ICTY statutes, the only
specific reference to complicity is in the genocide statute, which lists “complicity in genocide” a
punishable offense.3 This type of language is not unique to the ICTR and ICTY as it originates
from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Conventions), which also enumerates “complicity in genocide” as a punishable act.4 The ICTR
and ICTY statute, as well as the originally source material—the Genocide Conventions—attach
complicity only to genocide and place it in a statue that addresses criminal charges. This begs the
question, where does complicity as a mode of liability exist in the statutes of the ICTR and

2

ICTY Article 7(1), ICTR Article 6(1). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 18
and 19]
3

ICTR Article 2(3)(e), ICTY Article 4(3)(e). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source
18 and 19]
4

Article III(e) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. [Electronic copy provided
in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 9]
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ICTY? The simple answer is that there is no such section that specifically creates or indicates
complicity as a mode of liability. However, the specific inclusion of complicity in genocide
raises the question of whether it is hybrid mode of liability and criminal charge, or simply a
crime or mode of liability. 5 Subsequent discussion will consider the evolution of the Tribunals’
view of complicity and aiding and abetting.
B. How has the ICTY and ICTR approach to modes of liability evolved?
The ICTR first took on the challenge of addressing the difference between aiding and
abetting and complicity in genocide in the case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu. In this case, the ICTR
charged Akayesu with complicity in genocide, genocide, and generally with aiding and abetting
in various crimes.6 First, the Chamber determined that aiding and abetting are different, although
the terms often appear together and as synonymous.7 The Chamber stated, “Aiding means giving
assistance to someone. Abetting, on the other hand, would involve facilitating the commission of
an act by being sympathetic thereto.”8 The Chamber goes on to say that while many other legal
systems consider these modes of liability as a type of complicity, complicity is different than
aiding and abetting.9 Charging a person with aiding and abetting in genocide requires showing
that there was specific intent to commit such acts—an element that is not necessary for

5

Grant Dawson and Rachel Boyton, Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the
Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 241, 266 (discussing Judge Short’s
separate opinion in which there is an implication that complicity in genocide is a hybrid charge, combining mode of
liability with criminal charge). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 28]
6

Prosecutor v. Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Amended Indictment. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 4]
7

Prosecutor v. Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, P 484. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 5]
8

Id.

9

Id. at 485.
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complicity in genocide.10 Additionally, aiding and abetting requires a “genocidal intent” that is
not required for complicity. 11 Complicity requires a positive act while a person may aid and abet
a crime through “failing to act or refraining from action.”12 Through the Akayesu decision, the
ICTR Chamber determined that complicity, aiding, and abetting are different modes of liability.
In the case of Prosecutor v. Semnaza, the ICTR Chamber rejected the Akayesu view of
complicity, aiding, and abetting as separate and distinct modes of liability. 13 Like Akayesu, the
Prosecutor charged Semnaza with complicity in genocide, genocide, and other charges. 14 The
Chamber considered the meaning of complicity in common law, civil law, and Rwandan
domestic law and determined that, “prior jurisprudence has defined the term complicity as aiding
and abetting, instigating, and procuring.”15 The Chamber continues on to say
There is no material distinction between complicity in Article 2(3)(e) of the
Statute and the broad definition accorded to aiding and abetting in Article
6(1)…the mens rea requirement for complicity to commit genocide in Article
2(3)(e) mirrors that for aiding and abetting and the other forms of accomplice
liability in Article 6(1)16
The Chamber then concluded that complicity in genocide,
Refers to all acts of assistance or encouragement that have substantially
contributed to, or have had a substantial effect on, the completion of the crime of

10

Id.

11

Id. at 547.

12

Id. at 548.

13

Prosecutor v. Semnaza Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 33]
14

Id.

15

Id. at 393.

16

Id. at 394.

13

genocide. The accused must have acted intentionally and with the awareness that
he was contributing to the crime of genocide, including all its material elements17
Through this case, the Chamber rejects the distinctions between complicity and aiding
and abetting by stating that the two modes of liability share the same mental elements.
The ICTY Chamber agreed with the determination of the Semnaza Trial Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Stakic, reiterating that there is no material distinction between complicity and the
broad definition of aiding and abetting.18 Aiding and abetting genocide, according to the
Chamber, refers to, “all acts of assistance or encouragement that have substantially contributed
to, or have had a substantial effect on, the completion of the crime of genocide.” 19 The Chamber
states that, “complicity in genocide is possible only when genocide actually has been or is being
committed.”20 The Chamber also offers two varying approaches: (1) Article 4(3) is regarded as
lex specialis in relation to Article 7(1), lex generalis, or (2) the modes of liability in Article 7(1)
are lex speciali, while Article 4(3) is lex generalis.21 The first option means that the statute on
genocide is read into the statute on modes of liability and the second option means that the
modes of liability are read into the genocide statute.
Then, the Krstic Trial Chamber stated that complicity in genocide includes “aiding and
abetting the commission of genocidal acts with the knowledge of the principal’s genocidal intent

17

Id. at 395.

18

Prosecutor v. Stakic Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement P 531.

19

Id. at P 533.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 531.
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even if that intent is not shared.22 The Appeals Chamber elaborated further by stating that
complicity in genocide is a mode of liability for genocide, not a criminal charge.23 The Krstic
Appeals Chamber also considered the issue of lex specialis and lex generalis with regard to
Article 4(3) and Article 7(1); the Chamber determined that Article 7(1) should be read into
Article 4(3).24 Through this determination, the Krstic Appeals Chamber theorized that, as a mode
of liability based on Article 7(1) of ICTY statute, aiding and abetting is a form of complicity, and
under Article 4 of ICTY, complicity in genocide encompasses aiding and abetting.25
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, the defendant attempted to argue that complicity in
genocide is a punishable offense under ICTR statutes, but aiding and abetting in genocide—of
which the defendant was accused—was not.26 The Chamber countered this point by citing the
Krstic decision, which stated that complicity in genocide encompasses aiding and abetting. 27 The
Trial Chamber confirmed that complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting have identical

22

Prosecutor v. Krstic Case No: IT-98-33-T, Judgment, P 637. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 23]
23

See Prosecutor v. Krstic Case No: IT-98-33-A, Judgement. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 22]
24

Id.

25

Id. at 140.

26

Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A, Judgement and Sentence, P 368. [Electronic copy provided
in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 26]
27

Id. at 371.
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mens rea elements, 28 however, the Appeals Chamber later determined that this was an error of
law and the two modes of liability did not share the same mens rea requirement.29
In Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, the Chamber reinforced the idea that the charge of
complicity in genocide can include the modes of liability listed in ICTY Article 7(1), such as
aiding and abetting.30 The Chamber notes that this means that they could charge a person with
“complicity to aiding and abetting genocide,” and that such a charge would require specificity in
the indictment.31 Additionally, the Chamber noted that aiding and abetting in genocide required
the following elements:
(1) the accused carried out an act which consisted of practical assistance,
encouragement or moral support to the principal that had a “substantial effect” on
the commission of the crime; (2) the accused had knowledge that his or her own
acts assisted in the commission of the specific crime by the principal offender, (3)
the accused knew that the crime was committed with specific intent.32
The Chamber notes that complicity and co-participation are interchangeable, while aiding
and abetting falls under the larger category of complicity in genocide; aiding and abetting
is not synonymous with complicity. 33
In the case of Prosecutor v. Karemera, the Prosecutor attempted to argue that
complicity in genocide was a criminal charge, but the Chamber stated that complicity in

28

Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T, Judgement and Sentence, P 787 (Feb. 21, 2003).
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 38]
29

Supra note 27 at P 447.

30

Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, P 778. [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 7]
31

Id. at 780.

32

Id. at 782.

33

Id. at 777.
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genocide is a mode of liability, as decided in previous case law.34 The Chamber stated,
“jurisprudence of both ad hoc Tribunals has determined that complicity [in genocide] is
one of the forms of criminal responsibility that is applicable to the crime of genocide, and
not a crime itself."35 The Chamber goes on to state that complicity means aiding,
abetting, or instigating, a decision that the Chamber reached by looking at Rwandan law
as well as previous jurisprudence.36
The discussion and approach to complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting
evolved through Tribunal case law. With the Akayesu case, the Tribunals considered
complicity, aiding, and abetting to all be distinct and separate modes of liability. Then,
the Tribunals completely rejected this view and noted a similarity between complicity in
genocide and aiding and abetting in genocide. Through a series of subsequent cases, the
Tribunals determined that statutes enumerating modes of liability are read into statutes
enumerating crimes.37 In a related determination, the Tribunals stated that complicity is
genocide is a mode of liability and, as the name suggests, it exists only for genocide. 38
This is why complicity does not appear in the ICTY and ICTR statues enumerating
modes of liability. Therefore, the current view of modes of liability under the ICTY and
ICTR case law is that complicity in genocide is a broad term for accomplice liability

34

See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No.: ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defense Motions Challenging the Pleading of
a Joint Criminal Enterprise in a Count of Complicity in Genocide in the Amended Indictment, Articles 2 and 6(1) of
the Statute. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 21]
35

Id. at P 7.

36

Id.

37

Supra note 31 at P 679.

38

Id.
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specific to the charge of genocide, and complicity in genocide encompasses aiding and
abetting as well as the other modes of liability.
III. Legal Discussion
A. Modes of Liability in International Law
The ICTY and ICTR indicated an approach to complicity in genocide and aiding and
abetting that is specific to the mission of the Tribunals. In considering whether to follow the
approach set forth by the ICTY and ICTR, MICT should consider the approaches other legal
bodies use.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), which cites language
very similar to ICTY and ICTR statutes, enumerates aiding and abetting as a mode of liability
but does not mention complicity. 39 The statute specifically states, “Any Suspect who planned,
instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed the crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5,
6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be individually responsible for the crime.”40 Like ICTY and ICTR,
this statute does not list complicity as one of the modes of liability.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) also uses language similar to the other
tribunals. The SCSL statute recognizes “a person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed,
or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in

39

ECCC Article 29 (new)
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/20100726_Judgement_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.p
df (stating The ECCC Article 29 (new) states that “Any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted,
or committed the crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be individually responsible for
the crime). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 14]
40

Id.
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[the relevant articles of the respective statutes], shall be individually responsible for the crime. 41
As in the statutes of the other tribunals, there is no specific reference to complicity in the section
enumerating the modes of liability.
The International Criminal Court does not specifically recognize complicity as a mode of
liability in statues. The Rome Statute states, “for the purpose of facilitating the commission of
such a crime, aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission,
including providing the means for its commission.”42 Complicity refers to a larger category of
modes of liability that aims to capture the actions of those who do not physically commit a
crime.43
Customary international law uses complicity as a term that is interchangeable and even
synonymous with aiding and abetting.44 Customary international law frequently uses aiding as a
defining term for complicity. 45 In terms of state responsibility, complicity is defined as,
“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing
so if: (a) that State does so with the knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if
committed by that State.”46
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Complicity as an alternate term for aiding and abetting is enforced through the
association of aid with complicity.
In domestic legal systems, there are a variety of approaches to criminal liability. While
the Tribunals specifically indicate modes of liability with distinct mental and physical elements
that must be shown in addition to the mental and physical elements of a crime, the same is not
necessarily true in domestic legal systems, which sometimes ties the mode of liability to the
criminal charge.
In United States law, discussion of accomplice liability focuses on aiding and abetting.
Case law dictates that in order to prove aiding and abetting one must show:
(1) the accused had specific intent to facilitate the commission of a crime by
another; (2) the accused had the requisite intent of the underlying substantive
offense, (3) that the accused assisted or participated in the commission of the
underlying substantive offense and, (4) someone committed the underlying
offense.47
Complicity is not a separate mode of liability, but rather a general term that encompasses
accomplice liability. 48 US law indicates that complicity or aiding and abetting share the same
requirements of specific or active participation by the actor.49
In discussing complicity, British law uses the term to describe the larger category of
liability for perpetrators of a crime. 50 British common law acknowledges aiding and abetting as
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a type of complicity. 51 Complicity law, as it is broadly referred to, requires proving a mental and
physical element specific to the mode of liability under complicity. 52
Complicity in French law is a general term for types of accessory liability. 53 The French
approach to liability allows the state to charge a person with complicity through aiding and
abetting or complicity through instigating. 54 The language states, “The accomplice to a felony or
a misdemeanor is the person who knowingly, by aiding and abetting, facilitates its preparation or
commission.”55 To prove complicity through aiding and abetting, there must be a positive action
rather than inaction.56
Spanish criminal law notes that, “principals are those who perpetrate the act themselves,
alone, jointly, or by means of another used to aid and abet.”57 Unlike other criminal codes, the
Spanish criminal code does contain specific reference to complicity; however, it is not
contemplated in the same respect as aiding and abetting. For example, under the section
addressing penalties, the code states, “The above rules shall not be applicable in cases in which
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attempt and complicity are especially punishable by Law.” 58 The code also references complicity
in a section regarding terrorism, which states, “…the act shall be punished as co-perpetrators or
complicity as appropriate.”59 This indicates that complicity is not necessarily a separate mode of
liability but rather a general term, like co-perpetrator.
Russian criminal law contains a chapter entitled “Complicity in a Crime” that
distinguishes between the concept of complicity and other types of accomplice liability that fall
under complicity in a crime.60 The law states, “the intentional joint participation of two or more
person in the commission of a deliberate crime shall be deemed to be complicity in a crime.”61
The determination of liability depends on the level of participation of the accused and includes
organizers, instigators, or accessories.62
German law uses the term complicity, or co-participation, to cover organizers, instigators,
and aiders.63 German law specifically defines aiding and abetting separately, but does not define
complicity. Abetting is defined as, “any person who intentional induces another to intentionally
commit an unlawful act (abettor) shall be liable to be sentenced as if her were a principal.”64
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Aiding is defined as, “any person who intentionally assists another in the intentional commission
of an unlawful act shall be convicted and sentenced as an aider.”65
Chinese criminal law lacks any reference to complicity and mentions abetting in
reference to crimes of financial fraud.66 The law instead discusses accomplice liability in terms
of those who are coerced to commit a crime67 and those who instigate a crime.68 Chinese
criminal law does not use aiding and abetting or complicity in law related to accomplice and
principal liability.
Indian criminal law lacks any specific reference to complicity, but does acknowledge
“abettors” as a larger type of accomplice liability that encompasses other types of liability.69 The
types of accomplices mentioned include instigators, those who engage in conspiracy and those
who aid through act or omission.70 Abettor, rather than complicity, serves the purpose of being a
general term for a type of accomplice liability.
Lebanese law acknowledges six forms of accomplice liability, including complicity and
aiding and abetting as distinct forms of liability. 71 Lebanese law treats complicity in the same
way that other nations treat aiding and abetting.72 Although there are many overlaps between the
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Lebanese approach to complicity and international approach to aiding and abetting, there are two
notable exceptions.73 The first exception is that while international law generally requires
substantial assistance, Lebanese law specifically lists the means of support; the second exception
is that the accused must know of the crime to be committed and share the intent to further the
crime.74
B. MICT Approach to Modes of Liability
As illustrated above, there are numerous approaches to modes of liability that a legal
body can take. In domestic law, most countries use complicity as a general term for accomplice
liability and aiding and abetting is a type of complicity. In the legal systems that take this
approach, a state does not charge a person with complicity alone. Customary international law
does away with the distinction entirely by using the terms interchangeably. This is the most
straightforward and simplistic approach. In other Tribunals, the language of modes of liability is
quite similar to the language employed by the ICTY and ICTR. In these statutes, there is a
reference to aiding and abetting, but not to complicity. However, ICTY and ICTR both consider
complicity in genocide as a broad category under which other modes of liability fit.
The most telling information comes from the case law of ICTY and ICTR, which shows
the careful consideration given to statutory interpretation. In determining that the statute on
genocide is the lex generlias and the modes of liability statute is the lex specialis, there is an
argument to be made that the ICTY and ICTR adopted an approach similar to that of individual
nations. Complicity in genocide is a mode of liability by itself and aiding and abetting falls under
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the umbrella of complicity. It is this determination that allowed for a charge of complicity in
genocide through aiding and abetting.
In contrast, while the ICTR and ICTY statutes illustrate that complicity in genocide and
aiding and abetting have related meaning, an argument can be made that the mere inclusion of
both terms in statutes suggests a difference. To view complicity in genocide and aiding and
abetting as the same mode of liability creates a redundancy in the statute. While this could
simply be a drafting error later corrected by subsequent case law, to treat complicity in genocide
as a crime and as and distinct form of liability may capture a larger class of perpetrators.75 This
would be possible because complicity in genocide would require a lower mens rea requirement
than aiding and abetting. This would allow the MICT to charge a person who may not fall under
aiding and abetting.76 To take a view that could expand the number of persons MICT could reach
under the law would seem to be a strong argument in favor of rejecting the ICTY and ICTR
approach.
However, such an approach is at odds with ICTY and ICTR case law, as well as much of
domestic and international law. While it may be true that treating complicity as a distinct mode
of liability could capture a larger class of perpetrators; there is no indication that the current
enumerated modes of liability do not already capture the intended class of perpetrators. The
ICTY and ICTR considered the question of complicity in genocide as a mode of liability at
length over the course of several cases and came to the conclusion that complicity in genocide is
not a crime and mode of liability. The legal reasoning is sound and MICT should treat complicity
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in genocide as a broad term of accomplice liability that encompasses the modes of liability
enumerated in ICTR and ICTY statutes.
C. Cumulative Convictions
The principle of cumulative charging and cumulative convictions permits the Tribunals to
charge and convict a person of multiple offenses that are all based on the same underlying act. 77
Although cumulative charging and convictions raises the issue of double jeopardy78 and would
appear to have an inherent unfairness, both the ICTY and ICTR permitted cumulative charging
and convictions. The reasoning is as follows, “…prior to the presentation of all of the evidence,
it is not possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will
be proven.”79 The Tribunals permitted cumulative convictions only where the crimes meet tests
aimed at achieving fairness, such as identifying a materially distinct element in a statute that is
not present in the other.80
Through case law, the ICTY and ICTR upheld the validity of cumulative convictions and
created a variety of tests to determine if cumulative convictions are permissible. Cumulative
convictions first became an issue in the Tadic case, in which the Chamber convicted Tadic of
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crimes against humanity and war crimes, with sentences to run concurrently. 81 The test, known
as “totality of culpable conduct,” holds that “cumulative convictions are necessary to show the
whole pictures of the accused’s culpable criminal conduct.”82 By allowing the sentences to run
concurrently, there is a minimization of prejudice if a person were to be convicted of multiple
crimes.83
Another test, which comes from the Akayesu case, determined that cumulative
convictions were permissible if one of the following was satisfied: (1) the offences have different
elements; (2) the provisions creating the offences protect different interests; or (3) it is necessary
to record a conviction for both offences in order to fully describe what the accused did. 84
Cumulative convictions are not permitted if, “(1) one offense is a lesser included offence of the
other or (2) where the offenses charge both accomplice and principal liability.” 85 Under this test,
the Tribunal could convict a person for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
because they all have different elements and capture different types of perpetrators; additionally,
none of these charges are lesser forms of one another.86
The Celebci test, which stems from the Prosecutor v. Delalic, is a two-prong test which
permits multiple criminal convictions under different statutory provisions based on the same
conduct, if the statutory provisions have a materially distinct element not contained in the
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other.87 In the event that this test is not satisfied, only one conviction may be entered under the
more specific provision.88 In the dissent of the Delalic case, the Judges proposed a “substantive
distinct element test” in which the only elements considered would be those related to the actus
reus and mens rea of the accused.89 If the test was not satisfied, then the Chamber would
consider the totality of the circumstances to determine which of the multiple offenses most
accurately describes the actions of the accused.90
The existing body of case law only addresses the permissibility of cumulative convictions
with regards to criminal charges, not modes of liability; however, it may not be necessary to
consider how modes of liability fit in cumulative convictions. Across all of the tests created by
the ICTY and ICTR, there exists the common theme that cumulative convictions are permissible
if there is distinct difference between the criminal charges. 91 At face value, this means that a
person could not be charged with complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting in genocide
because the criminal charge is the same and does not pass any of the above mentioned tests.
Essentially, the conversation of cumulative convictions and modes of liability is moot if the
criminal charge is the same. If the criminal charges were different, then there would be no issue
with charging and convicting a person of both or all charges because they would pass the
cumulative convictions tests independent of the mode of liability.
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Regardless of the view that the MICT takes on complicity in genocide and aiding and
abetting, the outcome would be the same. If the MICT considers complicity in genocide and
aiding and abetting as the same or substantially similar, it would be redundant to charge a person
with both complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting in genocide. If MICT were to consider
complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting as separate modes of liability, charging under
both modes of liability is prohibited under the Celebci test, because MICT would have to charge
the person under the more specific provision.92 In application, this would likely mean that a
person would only be charged with aiding and abetting in genocide. Furthermore, there is ample
evidence to suggest that aiding and abetting captures the class of perpetrators that complicity in
genocide would capture. Therefore, MICT should not need to charge a person with both
complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting.
D. Language of the Indictment
ICTR and ICTY rules of procedure indicate that the tribunals were to issue indictments
that “set forth the name and particulars of the suspect, and a statement of the facts of the case and
of the crime with which the suspect is charged.” 93 In application, the ICTR and ICTY both
employed a lengthy narrative style that goes beyond the requirements of the rules of procedure.
The indictments give the accused an extremely detailed account of their crimes and other actions
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in precise detail.94 By providing such a wealth of information, the tribunals preempt issues that
may stem from leaving out details, such as amending or dismissing indictments. 95
The MICT should continue to employ a narrative style for the indictment, with particular
specificity as to the language of the statute. This is an impactful style that puts the accused on
notice of the details of their charges and crimes. With regard to the specific language of the
counts, the ICTY and ICTR both list the charge and cite the rule, however, no further
information is given in regards to the content of the statute cited.96 For example, the typical
language employed looks like this:
By his acts in relation to the events described in paragraphs 12-23, Jean Paul
AKAYESU is criminally responsible for:
COUNT 1: GENOCIDE, punishable by Article 2(3)(a) of the Statute of the
Tribunal;
COUNT 2: Complicity in GENOCIDE, punishable by Article 2(3)(e) of the
Statute of the Tribunal; and
COUNT 3: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (extermination), punishable by
Article 3(b) of the Statute of the Tribunal.97

Given the extremely detailed nature of the rest of the indictment, the reference to the
statute without including the full section of law lacks the same specificity used throughout the
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rest of the indictment. To increase the specificity of the counts, MICT could use language that
reflects the more descriptive narrative style employed in other parts of the indictment, such as:
By his actions in relation to the event described in paragraphs (insert paragraph
numbers), (Insert accused name here) is criminally responsible for:
COUNT 1: Aiding and abetting GENOCIDE, punishable by (Insert Article 7(1)
of ICTY statute or Article 6(1) of ICTR statute).

98

(insert name here) did plan,

instigate, order, commit or otherwise aid and abet in the planning, preparation or
execution of a crime referred to in [the relevant articles of the respective statutes],
and therefore shall be individually responsible for the crime99
The ultimate purpose of the indictment is to put the accused on notice of their crimes and
the charges, which the indictment accomplishes through the detailed account of the crimes. 100 In
keeping with this theme, that same detail should be given to the charging language. If the MICT
were to add more detail to the charging language, it would add clarity and specificity that is in
keeping with the narrative style used by the ICTY and ICTR.
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